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41-6-43 MOTOR VEHICLES 
sentence; substituted "any accident" for "an 
accident" in the first sentence; substituted 
"municipal department" for "city depart-
ment" in two places; inserted "written" 
before "report" in the first sentence; and 
added "on accidents occurring within their 












DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND 
RECKLESS DRIVING 
Powers of focal authorities. 
Negligent homicide - Death occurring within one year - Penalty - Revocation 
of license or privilege to drive. 
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug - Presumption arising from alco-
holic content of blood - Basis of percentage by weight of alcohol - Criminal 
punishment - Arrest without warrant - Revocation of license. 
Driving with blood alcohol content of .10% or higher unlawful - Penalty. 
Standards for chemical breath analysis - Evidence. 
Driving while intoxicated - Chemical tests as evidence - Presumption of blood 
alcohol level. 
Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug - Refusal to allow -
Warning, report, revocation of license - Court action on revocation - Person 
incapable of refusal - Results of test available - Who may give test - Evi-
dence. 
Drinking alcoholic beverage and open containers in motor vehicle prohibited -
Definitions - Exceptions - Penalty for violation. 
Reckless driving - Penalty. 
41-6-43. Powers of local authorities. (a) Local authorities may by 
ordinance provide that it shall be unlawful for any person who is under 
the influence of alcohol, or who has a blood alcohol content of .10% or 
greater, or who is under the influence of any drug or combined influence 
of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable 
of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control of any 
vehicle within this state, for the use of a chemical test or tests and for 
evidentiary presumptions, and for penalties consistent with sections 
41-6-44 and 41-6-44.2. 
(b) Local authorities may also by ordinance provide that any person 
who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of per-
sons or property is guilty of reckless driving, and provide penalties consist-
ent with section 41-6-45. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 242, § 12. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1978, ch. 33, § 54 repealed old section 
41-6-43 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 33; C. 1943, 57-7-110; 
L. 1957, ch. 75, § 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 1; 1969, ch. 
107, § 1), relating to powers of local authori-
ties as to driving while intoxicated and reck-
less driving, and new section 41-6-43 was 
enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 242, § 12. 
Cross-References. 
Traffic regulations, powers and duties of 
cities as to, 10-8-30: 
Effect of interim repeal. 
The interim repeal of this section did not 
render municipalities without authority to 
enact ordinances prohibiting driving under 
the influence of alcohol as municipalities had 
authority under their general police powers 
to enact such ordinances in the absence of a 
specific legislative grant of authority. Layton 
City v. Glines (1980) 616 P 2d 588. 
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Powers of cities. 
City held to have power to pass ordinance 
prohibiting driving while intoxicated, not-
withstanding statute on the subject. Salt 
Lake City v. Kusse (1938) 97 U 113, 93 P 2d 
671. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles ~ 332. 
61A CJS Motor Vehicles§§ 625-637. 
Driving while intoxicated or under influ-
ence of liquor or drugs, 7A AmJur 2d 478 et 
seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 296 
et seq. 
Constitutionality of legislative delegation 
of powers to prescribe or vary regulations 
concerning motor vehicles used on highways, 
87 ALR 546. 
41-6-43.10. Negligent homicide - Death occurring within one year 
- Penalty - Revocation of license or privilege to drive. (a) When the 
death of any person ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury 
received by the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety 
of others, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent 
homicide. 
(b) Any person convicted of negligent homicide shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or by fine of 
not less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment. 
(c) The department shall revoke the license or permit to drive and any 
nonresident operating privilege of any person convicted of negligent homi-
cide. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43.10, enacted by L. 
1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1957 amendment inserted "in the 
county jail" in subsec. (b). 
Title of Act. 
An act amending sections 41-6-6, 41-6-7, 
41-6-8, 41-6-9, 41-6-34, 41-6-36, 41-6-47, 
41-6-49, 41-6-70, 41-6-76, 41-6-77, 41-6-82, 
41-6-90, 41-6-114, 41-6-117, 41-6-120, 41-6-121, 
41-6-123, 41-6-124, 41-6-129, 41-6-131, 
41-6-133, 41-6-141, 41-6-142, 41-6-149, 
41-6-159, and 27-1-28, Utah Code Annotated 
1953; repealing and re-enacting sections 
41-6-14, 41-6-64, 41-6-130, 41-6-132, 41-6-134, 
41-6-135, 41-6-140, and 41-6-144, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953; enacting new sections 
41-6-43.10, 41-6-72.10, 41-6-121.10, 41-6-140.10, 
41-6-140.20, and 41-6-154.10, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953; and repealing section 27-9-8, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953; relating to the 
regulation of traffic on highways, and defin-
ing certain crimes in the use and operation of 
vehicles, prescribing the equipment used on 
vehicles and requiring the giving of notice of 
accidents by operators or occupants of motor 
vehicles involved. - Laws 1955, ch. 71. 
Cross-References. 
Automobile homicide, 76-5-207. 
Construction. 
A defendant is guilty of reckless disregard 
for the safety of others if the evidence sup-
ports a finding that the defendant con-
sciously chose a course of action knowing 
that such course would place his guest in 
grave and serious danger or with knowledge 
of facts which would disclose such danger to 
any reasonable person. This does not require 
a finding that defendant was fully conscious 
of the great danger to others since the stat-
ute does not require an intentional accident 
nor the choosing of a highly dangerous 
course while fully conscious or aware of the 
danger in following such course. State v. 
Berchtold (1960) 11 U 2d 208, 357 P 2d 183. 
Inattentive driving in the face of grave 
danger constitutes reckless disregard for the 
safety of others. State v. Berchtold (1960) 11 
U 2d 208, 357 P 2d 183. 
The term "reckless disregard" requires a 
much greater degree of disregard for the 
safety of others than does ordinary lack of 
due care for such safety, or mere negligence. 
State v. Berchtold (1960) 11 U 2d 208, 357 P 
2d 183. 
Double jeopardy. 
Where a defendant originally was charged 
with negligent homicide under this section 
and, after a preliminary hearing, the charge 
was dismissed and he was charged, tried, and 
convicted of automobile homicide under 
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former 76-30-7.4, he was not placed twice. in 
jeopardy by being tried for automobile homi-
cide after dismissal of the lesser charge. 
State v. Romero (1961) 12 U 2d 210, 364 P 2d 
828. 
Evidence. 
Where a defendant was charged with 
negligent homicide because he ran a red light 
and was involved in an intersection collision, 
he should have been allowed to introduce evi-
dence of other similar accidents occurring at 
the same intersection, and the city traffic 
engineer, as an expert, should have been per-
mitted to testify as to the lenses in the 
semaphore signal and their tendency to cause 
"sun phantom." State v. Stewart (1961) 12 U 
2d 273, 365 P 2d 785. 
Where the evidence showed that from the 
length of defendant's skid marks the police 
estimated his speed to have been 55 to 65 
miles per hour at the time his auto struck 
and killed a pedestrian in a 35-mile-per-hour 
zone, and that the defendant was familiar 
with the area and should have realized that 
people might be crossing the highway in the 
area, there was sufficient evidence upon 
which the trial court could base its finding 
that defendant was guilty of negligent homi-
cide. State v. Park (1965) 17 U 2d 90, 404 P 2d 
677. 
Where evidence showed that defendant 
knew of stop sign and restricted view at 
intersection where the collision occurred, and 
that, whether or not defendant ran the stop 
sign, he was traveling in excess of forty miles 
per hour when he reached the point of 
impact, and that the two vehicles were so 
close together when defendant entered the 
intersection that the driver of the other auto 
had no opportunity to apply her brakes prior 
to the collision, such evidence was sufficient 
to show conduct evincing a reckless disregard 
for the safety of others. State v. Selman 
(1966) 18 U 2d 199, 417 P 2d 975. 
View of tragedy. 
Defendant, convicted of negligent homicide 
by automobile under this section, was not 
prejudiced because, at the instance of the 
state, a view by the jury of the site of the 
tragedy was had under former 77-31-26 and 
the participation of the trial court thereat in 
asking numerous questions of prosecution 
witnesses, where the record showed that the 
judge showed unusual sympathy for defen-
dant, an apparent hotrodder, including the 
sentencing of defendant to but sixty days, 
servable on weekends. State v. Delaney (1964) 
15 U 2d 338, 393 P 2d 379. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles ¢o> 342, 344. 
61A CJS Motor Vehicles §§ 657-671. 
7A AmJur 2d 518, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 333. 
What amounts to negligent homicide 
within me;ining of statutes penalizing negli-
gent homicide by operation of a motor vehi-
cle, 20 ALR 3d 473. 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug - Pre-
sumption arising from alcoholic content of blood - Basis of percent-
age by weight of alcohol - Criminal punishment - Arrest without 
warrant - Revocation of license. (a) It is unlawful and punishable as 
provided in subsection (d) of this section for any person who is under the 
influence of alcohol, or who is under the influence of any drug or combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical con-
trol of any vehicle within this state. The fact that any person charged with 
violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug 
shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this section. 
(b) In any criminal prosecution for a violation of subsection (a) of this 
section relating to driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, 
or in any civil suit or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been 
committed by any person while driving or in actual physical control of a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the amount of alcohol in the 
person's blood at the time alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the 
person's blood, breath, or other bodily substance shall give rise to the fol-
lowing presumptions: 
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(1) If there was at that time 0.05 per cent or less by weight of alcohol 
in the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was not under 
the influence of alcohol; 
(2) If there was at that time in excess of 0.05 per cent but less than 
0.08 per cent by weight of alcohol in the person's blood, such fact shall 
not give rise to any presumption that the person was or was not under 
the influence of alcohol, but such fact may be considered with other compe-
tent evidence in determining whether the person was under the influence 
of alcohol; 
(3) If there was at the time 0.08 per cent or more by weight of alcohol 
in the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was under the 
influence of alcohol; 
( 4) The foregoing provisions of this subsection shall not be construed 
as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon 
the question whether or not the person was under the influence of alcohol. 
(c) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams 
of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood. 
(d) Every person who is convicted of a violation of this section shall 
be punished by imprisonment for not less than 30 days nor more than six 
months, or by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $299, or by both, 
such fine and imprisonment; provided that in the event such person shall 
have inflicted a bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having 
operated said vehicle in a negligent manner, he shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, and, in the 
discretion of the court, by a fine of not more than $1,000. For the purposes 
of this section, the standard of negligence shall be that of simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which ordinarily reason-
able and prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances. 
(e) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction 
under this section, the court shall, in addition to the penalties provided 
in subsection (d), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than two 
nor more than 10 days with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the 
jail, or require the person to work in an alcohol rehabilitation facility for 
not less than two nor more than 10 days. Upon a subsequent conviction 
within five years after a second conviction under this section, the court 
shall, in addition to the penalties provided in subsection (d), impose a 
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 10 nor more than 30 days with 
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person 
to work in an alcohol rehabilitation facility for not less than 10 nor more 
than 30 days. No portion of any sentence imposed pursuant to subsection · 
(d) shall be suspended nor shall the convicted person be eligible for parole 
or probation until such time as the sentence provided for in this subsection 
has been served. 
(f) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a viola-
tion of this section when such violation is coupled with an accident or colli-
sion in which such person ir;; involved and when such violation has, in fact, 
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been committed, although not in his presence, if the officer has reasonable 
cause to believe that the violation was committed by such person. 
(g) The department shall revoke the operator's or chauffeur's license 
of any person convicted under this section. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943, 
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75, § 1; 
1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, ch. 
268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment inserted subsecs. (b) 
and (c); redesignated former subsec. (b) as 
(d); and made minor changes in phraseology. 
The 1957 amendment deleted provisions 
applying to first, second or subsequent con-
victions in subsec. (d); added the proviso to 
subsec. (d); and deleted "or under an ordi-
nance as provided by section 41-6-43 (a)" at 
the end of the section. 
The 1967 amendment deleted references to 
narcotic drugs in subsec. (a); changed the 
blood alcohol content from 0.15% to 0.08%; 
inserted "or be in actual physical control" in 
subsec. (c); added subsec. (e); and made 
minor changes in phraseology. 
The 1969 amendment inserted "or in any 
civil suit * * * under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor" in subsec. (b); deleted "urine" 
before "breath" in the first sentence of 
subsec. (b); substituted "whether the person 
was under the influence of intoxicating liq-
uor" in subd. (b)2 for "the guilt or innocence 
of the person"; and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation. 
The 1977 amendment substituted "alcohol" 
for "intoxicating liquor" throughout the 
section; combined former subsecs. (a) and (c) 
as subsec. (a); inserted subsec. (c); and made 
a minor change in phraseology. 
The 1979 amendment inserted subsec. (e); 
and redesignated former subsec. (e) as (f). 
The 1981 amendment substituted "negli-
gent manner" in subsec. (d) for "reckless or 
negligent manner or with a wanton or reck-
less disregard of human life or safety"; added 
the second sentence to subsec. (d); and made 
minor changes in phraseology and style. 
Cross-References. 
Assessment in addition to fine upon convic-
tion, use for drinking driver rehabilitation 
program, 63-43-9 to 63-43-11. 
Assessments to fund intoxicated driver 
rehabilitation account, 63-43-10. 
Automobile homicide, 76-5-207. 
Department of health to issue permits for 
drawing of blood, 26-1-30(19). 
Motorboat or vessel, operating under influ-
ence, 73-18-12. 
Constitutionality. 
It is within the prerogative of the legis-
lature to make it unlawful for one to drive a 
vehicle while under the influence of liquor 
and to provide a greater penalty if, while 
doing so, he injures another by recklessness 
or negligence. State v. Brennan (1962) 13 U 
2d 195, 371 P 2d 27. 
This section does not deal with two sep-
arate subjects and thus transgress Const., 
Art. 1, § 12 which requires that legislative 
acts must contain only one subject. State v. 
Brennan (1962) 13 U 2d 195, 371 P 2d 27. 
Actual physical control. 
Defendant who was asleep in automobile, 
completely off traveled portion of highway 
with engine shut off, was not in "actual 
physical control" of the vehicle. State v. 
Bugger (1971) 25 U 2d 404, 483 P 2d 442. 
Blood-alcohol test. 
Where officer testified that he obtained the 
defendant's consent to the taking of a blood-
alcohol test, which fact was also attested by 
the nurse and by the physician who took the 
blood sample, the evidence left no doubt that 
defendant gave his consent to such a test. 
State v. Bryan (1964) 16 U 2d 47, 395 P 2d 
539. 
After an accused has been lawfully placed 
under arrest it is the duty of the officers to 
make a search for evidence relative to the 
commission of the crime. The blood-alcohol 
test is designed for that purpose. State v. 
Bryan (1964) 16 U 2d 47, 395 P 2d 539. 
Breathalyzer test reading of .27 is suffi-
cient to sustain the findings of the trial court 
that defendant operated his vehicle in a 
willful and wanton disregard for the safety 
of others. Ellefsen v. Robert (1974) 526 P 2d 
912. 
Conflict between state and city authori-
ties. 
City held to have power to pass ordinance 
prohibiting driving while intoxicated, not-
withstanding statute on the subject. Salt 
Lake City v. Kusse (1938) 97 U 113, 93 P 2d 
671. 
If city ordinance prescribes the punish-
ment for drunken driving as confinement in 
city jail, court or judge is without authority 
to order confinement in county jail. Ex parte 
Folck (1942) 102 U 470, 132 P 2d 130. 
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Where evidence is conflicting, it is for the 
jury to say whether defendant was guilty of 
driving a vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor. State v. Stewart (1946) 
110 U 203, 171 P 2d 383. 
Conviction of the crime of involuntary 
manslaughter as the result of a collision 
between an automobile, which defendant was 
driving, and a pedestrian was upheld, where 
evidence showed that he had imbibed to such 
a degree that it was apparent to all who saw 
and heard him that his locomotion and his 
power of speech were markedly affected, and 
it appeared that such criminal negligence 
contributed to the death. A person who 
drives a car while in such a condition is reck-
less and evinces a marked disregard for the 
safety of others and is therefore guilty of 
criminal negligence. State v. Capps (1947) 111 
U 189, 176 P 2d 873. 
Conflict between state and municipal 
regulation. 
Municipal ordinance prohibiting driving 
under the influence of alcohol was enforce-
able where, although not as extensive as the 
provisions of the state statute, it did not con-
flict with the state statute. Layton City v. 
Glines (1980) 616 P 2d 588. 
Delay in arrest. 
Where law enforcement officers on arriving 
at scene of automobile collision found injured 
defendant sitting on curb and took him to a 
nearby hospital for treatment of his wounds 
before making arrest, the delay in the arrest 
was not unreasonable. State v. Bryan (1964) 
16 U 2d 47, 395 P 2d 539. 
Double jeopardy. 
In a prosecution for violating this section, 
although court erred in refusing state's 
request to submit case to jury on included 
offense of drunken driving, double jeopardy 
did not permit further proceedings against 
defendant. State v. Brennan (1962) 13 U 2d 
195,371 P 2d 27. 
Included offense. 
Subsection (a) of this section prohibits the 
driving of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of liquor as a separate offense, with 
a separate punishment as a misdemeanor as 
set forth in subsec. (d); and it is necessarily 
included in the greater offense of driving 
while intoxicated and injuring another in a 
reckless or negligent manner, which is pun-
ishable as an indictable misdemeanor. State 
v. Brennan (1962) 13 U 2d 195, 371 P 2d 27. 
Defendant could be prosecuted under this 
section even though he had pleaded guilty to 
driving without a license, without a registra-
tion certificate, and without a safety sticker, 
since each citation charged a separate offense 
entirely unrelated to each other. Hupp v. 
Johnson (1980) 606 P 2d 253. 
Jury trial. 
Defendants charged with driving under the 
influence of alcohol, a Class B misdemeanor 
with maximum possible imprisonment of six 
months, had no federally protected right to 
jury trial, and therefore could claim no right 
to six-member panel as opposed to four-
member juries which convicted them. State 
v. Nuttall (1980) 611 P 2d 722. 
Presumptions of intoxication. 
In cases arising before the enactment of 
41-6-44.5, if state is unable to produce test 
results sufficient to permit a presumption of 
intoxication when the test was given, it must 
provide expert testimony to extrapolate the 
results back to the time of the incident to 
show defendant's blood alcohol level was suf-
ficient at that time to give rise to the pre-
sumption before state is entitled to rely on 
the presumption at trial. State v. Bradley 
(1978) 578 P 2d 1267. 
Procedure to be followed where prior con-
victions alleged. 
As a guide for future cases, where there is 
an allegation of prior crimes or prior convic-
tions, the Supreme Court has outlined the 
procedure to be followed in the trial courts, 
which will properly expedite the adjudication 
of such cases, while at the same time safe-
guarding the substantial rights of accused 
persons, and prevent an accused person from 
being advertised to the jury as one who 
previously perpetrated a similar type of 
offense. State v. Stewart (1946) 110 U 203, 171 
P 2d 383, setting out the procedure at length, 
following Connecticut cases. 
Proof of prior convictions. 
Upon trial of information for drunken 
driving, introduction of evidence of prior con-
victions before a determination of the issue 
on the substantive charge, even if erroneous, 
would not warrant directing an acquittal, 
and evidence of prior conviction is admissi-
ble, even though conviction followed plea of 
guilty, and may be shown under proper 
procedure. But until a verdict has been 
rendered on the principal issue, there is no 
occasion to mention prior convictions, since 
previous offenses would not be competent to 
prove that defendant committed the offense 
for which he is then on trial. State v. Stewart 
(1946) 110 U 203, 171 P 2d 383, pointing out 
manner of showing prior convictions from 
the records of justice and city courts, not-
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withstanding informality of proceedings in 
such courts and lack of judgment book. 
Where the defendant is charged with a 
prior conviction of driving while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor it is incum-
bent upon the state to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the prior conviction. It was 
then the exclusive province of the jury to 
determine from the evidence whether the 
state had done so. The trial court's comments 
on the evidence and his limiting the jury's 
deliberation to whether the record of the 
prior conviction was authentic was error 
prejudicial to defendant. State v. Harris 
(1953) 1 U 2d 182, 264 P 2d 284, 39 ALR 2d 
553. 
Upon information charging defendant with 
driving under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor and with commission of prior offense, 
where the docket of the justice of the peace 
was received in evidence, the page identified 
and the verity of the entry stipulated to in 
open court as being in the handwriting of the 
justice, the entry, under 78-5-16, became 
prima facie evidence of the facts so stated, 
and no evidence to the contrary having been 
offered, must be presumed to be correct and 
sustains the court's finding of guilt of prior 
conviction. State v. Bailey (1955) 3 U 2d 254, 
282 P 2d 339. 
Proof to sustain conviction. 
Under former subsec. (a) "operating an 
automobile on a public street or highway by 
one under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
is itself an unlawful act and an offense." But 
a conviction of involuntary manslaughter 
will be reversed unless the charge is suffi-
ciently proven. State v. Johnson (1930) 76 U 
84, 88, 287 P 909, overruled on other grounds 
in State v. Crank (1943) 105 U 332, 355, 142 P 
2d 178, 188, 170 ALR 542. 
Testimony that three or four hours after 
accident liquor was detected by odor on 
defendant's breath does not prove the charge 
of drunken driving, and "driving an automo-
bile in violation of traffic rules or ordinances 
in one or more particulars, or driving it 
negligently or even recklessly, resulting in an 
accident, does not relevantly tend to prove 
that the driver was under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor." State v. Johnson (1930) 
76 U 84, 88, 287 P 909, overruled on other 
grounds in State v. Crank (1943) 105 U 332, 
355, 142 P 2d 178, 188, 170 ALR 542. 
Public intoxication. 
Following an automobile collision defen-
dant was sitting on curb holding a 
handkerchief to his head which was bleeding; 
there was a strong odor of alcohol on his 
breath; he appeared to be intoxicated, and 
stated that he was drunk. A bottle containing 
whiskey was found on the floor of his auto-
mobile. He was taken to a nearby hospital 
where his wounds were attended and he was 
placed under arrest under this section for 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. 
Under such circumstances arrest of defen-
dant was justified though offense for which 
he was arrested was not committed in the 
presence of the arresting officer, the defen-
dant being intoxicated in a public place in 
violation of 32-7-13, and upon death of his 
passengers, he was charged with automobile 
homicide under former 76-30-7.4. State v. 
Bryan (1964) 16 U 2d 47, 395 P 2d 539. 
Venue. 
Where the testimony adequately estab-
lished where the offense was committed, the 
court will take judicial notice that that point 
is in the county so that the venue has been 
sufficiently established. State v. Bailey (1955) 
3 U 2d 254,282 P 2d 339. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles ,s:;, 332. 
61A CJS Motor Vehicles § 628. 
7A AmJur 2d 478.-498, Automobiles and 
Highway Traffic §§ 296-311. 
Admissibility and weight of evidence based 
on scientific test for intoxication or presence 
of alcohol in system, 127 ALR 1513, 159 ALR 
209. . 
Admissibility, in vehicle accident case, of 
evidence of opposing party's intoxication 
where litigant's pleading failed to allege such 
fact, 26 ALR 2d 359. 
Admissibility of hospital record relating to 
intoxication or sobriety of patient, 38 ALR 2d 
778. 
Applicability, to operation of motor vehicle 
on private property, of legislation making 
drunken driving a criminal offense, 29 ALR 
3d 938. 
Constitutionality and effect of statute 
relating to civil liability of person driving 
automobile while under influence of liquor, 56 
ALR 327. 
Degree or nature of intoxication for pur-
poses of statute or ordinance making it a 
criminal offense to operate an automobile 
while in that condition, 142 ALR 555. 
Driving automobile while intoxicated as a 
substantive criminal offense, 42 ALR 1498, 49 
ALR 1392, 68 ALR 1356, 142 ALR 555. 
Drugs, driving under the influence, or when 
addicted to use of as criminal offense, 17 
ALR 3d815. 
Intoxication from specified percentages of 
alcohol present in system, construction and 
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application of statutes creating presumption 
or other inference, 16 ALR 3d 748. 
What constitutes driving, being in control 
of, or operating a motor vehicle within stat-
ute making such act, while intoxicated, an 
offense, 47 ALR 2d 570. 
What constitutes driving, operating, or 
being in control of motor vehicle for purposes 
of driving while intoxicated statute or ordi-
nance, 93 ALR 3d 7. 
What is "motor vehicle" within statutes 
making it offense to drive while intoxicated, 
66 ALR 2d 1146. 
Law Reviews. 
Utah Legislative Survey - 1979, 1980 Utah 
L. Rev.155. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Blood-alcohol test. 
Presumption of intoxication arising from 
presence of 0.08% alcohol in blood was 
inapplicable to automobile homicide prose-
cution under former statute, and instructing 
of jury on presumption was reversible error. 
State v. Risk (1974) 520 P 2d 215. 
Proof of intoxication. 
In a prosecution for automobile homicide 
where there was competent, substantial, 
expert testimony that defendant's alcohol-
blood content was not only 0.15, but 0.224, 
which would impair motor and sensory reac-
tions, an instruction by the court that 0.15 
alcohol-blood content raised a presumption 
that one would be under the influence was 
not prejudicial. State v. Romero (1961) 12 U 
2d 210, 364 P 2d 828. 
41-6-44.2. Driving with blood alcohol content of .10% or higher 
unlawful - Penalty. (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section for any person with a blood alcohol content 
of .10% or greater, by weight, to drive or be in actual physical control of 
any vehicle within this state. 
(b) Every person who is convicted of a violation of this section shall 
be punished by imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than 
six months, or by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $299, or by 
both. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.2, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 80, § 2. 
Title of Act. 
An act amending section 41-2-18, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 
69, Laws of Utah 1955, and enacting section 
41-6-44.2, Utah Code Annotated 1953; relat-
ing to driving under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor; providing a misdemeanor clas-
sification for anyone driving a vehicle when 
their blood alcohol content is .10% or higher; 
and providing drivers license revocation. 
Laws 1973, ch. 80. 
Cross-References. 
Revocation of license, 41-2-18. 
Constitutionality. 
This statute states with sufficient clarity 
and conciseness the two elements necessary 
to constitute its violation; a blood alcohol 
concentration of .10%, and concurrent opera-
tion or actual physical control of any vehicle. 
Greaves v. State (1974) 528 P 2d 805. 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis - Evidence. 
(1) The commissioner of public safety shall establish standards for the 
administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath 
including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that 
a person was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol. or driving with a blood alcohol content of .10% 
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or greater, documents offerred as memoranda or records of acts, conditions 
or events to prove that the analysis and accuracy of the instrument were 
made pursuant to standards established in subsection (1) shall be admissi-
ble if: 
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the 
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition or event; and 
(b) The source of information from which made and the method and 
circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trust-
worthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under subsection 
(1) and the provisions of subsection (2) have been met, there shall be a 
presumption that the test results are valid and further foundation for 
introduction of the evidence is unnecessary. 
History: C. 1943, 41-6-44.3, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 243, § 2. 
Title of Act. 
An act amending section 41-6-44, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 
75, Laws of Utah 1957, as amended by chap-
ter 88, Laws of Utah 1967, as amended by 
chapter 107, Laws of Utah 1969, as amended 
by chapter 268, Laws of Utah 1977, repealing 
and reenacting section 41-6-44.5, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 270, 
Laws of Utah 1977, and enacting section 
41-6-44.3, Utah Code Annotated 1953; relat-
ing to motor vehicles; providing for manda-
tory jail sentences for persons convicted of 
having two or more convictions for driving 
under the influence of alcohol; providing for 
the establishment of guidelines for chemical 
analysis of accused's breath; providing pre-
sumption of accuracy for test; and expanding 
admissibility of such evidence. - Laws 1979, 
ch. 243. 
Collateral References. 
Necessity and sufficiency of proof that tests 
of blood alcohol concentration were con-
ducted in conformance with prescribed 
methods, 96 ALR 3d 745. 
41-6-44.5. Driving while intoxicated - Chemical tests as evidence 
- Presumption of blood alcohol level. (1) In any action or proceeding 
in which it is material to prove that a person was driving or in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or with 
a blood alcohol content of .10% or greater, the results of a chemical test 
or tests as authorized in section 41-6-44.10 shall be admissible as evidence. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken within two hours of the alleged driv-
ing or actual physical control, the blood alcohol level of the person at the 
time of the alleged driving or actual physical control shall be presumed 
to be not less than the level of the alcohol determined to be in the blood 
by the chemical test. 
(3) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the 
alleged driving or actual physical control, the test result shall be admissi-
ble as evidence of the person's blood alcohol level at the time of the alleged 
driving or actual physical control, but the trier of fact shall determine 
what weight shall be given to the result of the test. 
(4) The foregoing provisions of this section shall not be construed as 
limiting the consideration or application by the trier of fact of the pre-
sumptions set forth in section 41-6-44, nor shall they prevent a court from 
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receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood alcohol 
level at the time of the alleged driving or actual physical control. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.5, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 243, § 3. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1979, ch. 243, § 3 repealed old section 
41-6-44.5 (L. 1977, ch. 270, § 1), relating to 
chemical tests as evidence and the presump-
tion of blood alcohol level, and enacted new 
section 41-6-44.5. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Relation back of test results. of the incident by expert testimony to be 
Results of chemical analysis test were not admissible as evidence. State v. Bradley 
required to be extrapolated back to the time (1978) 578 P 2d 1267. 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug -
Refusal to allow - Warning, report, revocation of license - Court 
action on revocation - Person incapable of refusal - Results of test 
available - Who may give test - Evidence. (a) Any person operating 
a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent 
to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose 
of determining whether he was driving or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combina-
tion of alcohol and any drug, provided that such test is or tests are admin-
istered at the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe such 
person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol 
and any drug. A ~~~ce officer shall determine which of .the af ores~id te_ets 
shall be administerei - ---
-- "Fo -person, ·wno lias' bee:ru~~ested pursuant to t~!S section to submit 
to a chem_ical t~si;_o.r_tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have the 
right to select the test or tests to be administered. The failure-or inabfiity 
or :rpe::ree officer to-·arraiige for any specific test shall not be a defense 
to taking a test requested by a peace officer nor be a defense in any crimi-
nal, civil or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to 
submit to the requested test or tests. 
(b) If such person has been placed under arrest and has thereafter been 
requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical 
tests provided for in subsection (a) of this section and refuses to submit 
to such chemical test or tests, such person shall be warned by a peace offi-
cer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests 
can result in revocation of his license to operate a motor vehicle. Following 
this warning, unless such person immediately requests the chemical test 
or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, no test shall be given 
and a peace officer shall submit a sworn report that he had grounds to 
believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical con-
trol of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug 
or combination of alcohol and any drug and that the person had refused 
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to submit to a chemical test or tests as set forth in subsection (a) of this 
section. Within 20 days after receiving a sworn report from a-peace officer 
to the effect that such person has refused a chemical test or tests the 
department shall notify such person of a hearing before the department. 
If at said hearing the department determines that the person was granted 
the right to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to 
such test or tests, or if such person fails to appear before the department 
as required in the notice, the department shall revoke for one year his 
license or permit to drive. Any person whose license has been revoked by 
the department under the provisions of this section shall have the right 
to file a petition within 30 days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in 
the district court in the county in which such person shall reside. Such 
court is hereby vested with jurisdiction, and it shall be its duty to set the 
matter for trial de novo upon 10-days' written notice to the department 
and thereupon to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case 
and to determine whether the petitioner's license is subject to revocation 
under the provisions of this act. 
(c) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition 
rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any such chemical test or 
tests shall be deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided for in 
subsection (a) of this section, and the test or tests may be administered 
whether such person has been arrested or not. 
(d) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of such 
test or tests shall be made available to him. 
(e) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or person author-
ized under subsection 26-1-30 (19), acting at the request of a peace officer 
can withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug 
content therein. This limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine 
or breath specimen. Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or 
person authorized under subsection 26-1-30 (19) who, at the direction of 
a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace 
officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospi-
tal or medical facility at which such sample is drawn, shall be immune 
from any civil or criminal liability arising therefrom, provided such test 
is administered according to standard medical practice. 
(f) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician 
of his own choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the test or 
tests administered at the direction of a peace officer. The failure or inabil-
ity to obtain such additional test shall not affect admissability of the 
results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, nor 
preclude nor delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a peace 
officer. Such additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests admin-
istered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(g) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical 
test or tests, the person to be tested shall not have the right to consult 
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an attorney nor shall such a person be permitted to have an attorney, 
physician or other person present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
(h) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or 
tests under the provisions of this section, evidence of refusal shall be 
admissible in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts 
alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.10, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 43. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1981, ch. 126, § 43 repealed old 
section 41-6-44.10 (L. 1957, ch. 80, § (1]; 1959, 
ch. 65, § 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 3; 1969, ch. 107, § 3; 
1977, ch. 268, § 4), relating to implied consent 
to tests, and enacted new section 41-6-44.10. 
Cross-References. 
Chemical tests as evidence of intoxication, 
41-6-44.5. 
Department of health to issue permits for 
drawing of blood, 26-1-30(19). 
Motorboat or vessel, operating under influ-
ence, 73-18-12. 
Constitutionality - standing to raise. 
Motorist who submitted to blood-alcohol 
test and was convicted of driving while intox-
icated had no standing to challenge constitu-
tionality of this section, not having been con-
victed under or by reason of it. Salt Lake 
City v. Perkins (1959) 9 U 2d 317, 343 P 2d 
1106. 
Administration of test. 
An officer administering a breathalyzer 
test under this section can require an 
arrested person to furnish what the officer 
reasonably believes to be a viable sample, 
and the "green light" that is activated when 
55 c.c's of breath have been acquired is 
merely an aid in making that determination. 
Powell v. Cox (1980) 608 P 2d 239. 
Choice of tests. 
The 1959 amendment to this section did 
not change the section so as to alter the 
court's interpretation that the choice of 
chemical tests is to be made by the driver 
and not by the officer and, where an officer 
failed to give the driver his choice of tests, he 
failed to comply with the statute and revoca-
tion of the driver's license under the implied 
consent law was invalid. Bean v. State, 
Department of Public Safety (1961) 12 U 2d 
76, 362 P 2d 750. 
Civil nature of statute. 
Implied consent provisions are obviously 
civil in nature, as opposed to criminal, since 
they are devoid of criminal sanctions and 
provide only for revocation of the privilege of 
operating a motor vehicle, and since adminis-
trative hearing may be had subsequent to the 
test followed by trial de novo. Cavaness v. 
Cox (1979) 598 P 2d 349. 
Conditional consent. 
Defendant had no right to impose any con-
ditions as a prerequisite to giving consent, 
and demanding any unreasonable or imprac-
tical conditions as a prerequisite was a 
refusal to give consent. Moran v. Shaw (1978) 
580 P 2d 241. 
Evidence. 
Where defendant was injured in an auto-
mobile accident and taken to a hospital 
where a physician directed a medical 
technologist to draw a blood sample for 
cross-matching, and a police officer directed 
the taking of a sample for a blood alcohol 
test, the results of which showed a blood 
alcohol level of .13%, results of the test were 
properly admitted into evidence at defen-
dant's subsequent prosecution under 
76-5-207(1) for automobile homicide, because 
the test was done at the direction and under 
the supervision of defendant's doctor. State 
v. Durrant (1977) 561 P 2d 1056, implying dis-
approval of Gibb v. Dorius (1975) 533 P 2d 
299. 
Grounds of peace officer requesting test. 
Due process requires that peace officer 
must have reasonable grounds for his belief 
that the person requested to submit to the 
chemical test was driving or in actual physi-
cal control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs; reasonable 
grounds exist where the facts and circum-
stances within the officer's knowledge and of 
which he had reasonably trustworthy infor-
mation are sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief that the situation exists. Ballard v. 
State, Motor Vehicle Division (1979) 595 P 2d 
1302. 
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Miranda warning. 
Rights explained in a Miranda warning to 
remain silent and to consult an attorney do 
not apply to the decision to take a chemical 
test; it is incumbent on the arresting officer 
to explain this unequivocally to the motorist, 
and questions of whether he did so explain it 
and whether the motorist was confused and 
manifested his confusion to the arresting 
officer are for the trier of fact to determine. 
Holman v. Cox (1979) 598 P 2d 1331; Muir v. 
Cox (1980) 611 P 2d 384. 
Since license revocation proceeding was 
not a criminal proceeding, fact that officer 
who arrested motorist and requested him to 
take breathalyzer test did not give him 
Miranda warning did not render officer's 
testimony inadmissible in the revocation pro-
ceeding. Smith v. Cox (1980) 609 P 2d 1332. 
Prerequisites for admission into evidence. 
Chemical test could not be taken without 
driver's consent prior to his arrest, so that 
district court erred in admitting results of 
test in prosecution for automobile homicide 
where defendant had objected to taking of 
blood sample and was not, at time blood 
sample was extracted, under arrest. State v. 
Cruz (1968) 21 U 2d 406, 446 P 2d 307. 
Presence of counsel. 
Person had no right to presence of counsel 
during taking of, or as condition of taking, 
any test. Cavaness v. Cox (1979) 598 P 2d 349; 
Holman v. Cox (1979) 598 P 2d 1331. 
Proceeding to revoke license for failure to 
submit to test. 
Acquittal of the defendant under the crim-
inal charge of driving under the influence is 
not a bar to revocation of the driver's license 
for failure to submit to a chemical test when 
requested to do so. Ballard v. State, Motor 
Vehicle Division (1979) 595 P 2d 1302. 
At a proceeding to revoke a driver•s license 
for failure to submit to a chemical test when 
so requested, driver is entitled to procedural 
due process, although not to the same 
protections afforded a defendant in a crimi-
nal prosecution, is not required to post bond 
nor appear at the administrative hearing, 
cannot be fined or imprisoned either for his 
refusal to submit to a test or for his failure 
to appear at the hearing, and if he fails to 
appear or it is determined at the hearing 
that he was granted the right to submit to a 
chemical test and refused, the department's 
authority is limited to revocation of the 
driver's license for one year. Ballard v. State 
Motor Vehicle Division (1979) 595 P 2d 1302. ' 
The purpose of the administrative proceed-
ing to revoke a driver's license for failure to 
submit to a chemical test is to protect the 
public, not to punish drunken drivers; such 
drivers are subject to separate criminal 
prosecution for purposes of punishment. 
Ballard v. State, Motor Vehicle Division 
(1979) 595 P 2d 1302. 
The rule that the corpus delicti of the 
crime must be established by evidence inde-
pendent of the accused's confession is not 
applicable to a proceeding to revoke a 
driver's license for failure to submit to a 
chemical test since such proceeding is not 
criminal in nature. Ballard v. State, Motor 
Vehicle Division (1979) 595 P 2d 1302. 
Reasonable refusal. 
This section as amended in 1977 precludes 
the defense of "reasonable refusal" as was 
contemplated by prior cases and now pro-
vides for a simple "yes" or "no" to the 
officer's request to take a test. Cavaness v. 
Cox (1979) 598 P 2d 349. 
Refusal to submit to test. 
Express verbal refusal is not necessary to 
withdraw the consent implied by the statute, 
which is only a fictional consent anyway; a 
refusal in fact, regardless of the words that 
accompany it, can be as convincing as an 
express verbal refusal, and that includes 
playing verbal games with the officer to avoid 
a direct refusal. Beck v. Cox (1979) 597 P 2d 
1335. 
Revocation of license was supported by 
substantial, competent, uncontradicted evi-
dence that driver gave an explicit verbal 
refusal to take chemical test after being 
properly warned. Miles v. Cox (1979) 597 P 2d 
1344. 
Motorist's refusal to take blood test until 
he could call his lawyer constituted refusal 
under the statute and a valid basis for revo-
cation of his· license. Fjelsted v. Cox (1980) 
611 P2d. 882. 
Trial de novo in district court. 
The trial de novo in the district court to 
review an administrative revocation of a 
driver's license for refusal to submit to a 
blood test for alcohol content pursuant to the 
implied consent statute is a complete retrial 
upon new evidence with the burden of proof 
and the burden of going forward with the 
evidence upon the drivers license division. 
Pledger v. Cox (1981) 626 P 2d 415. 
Collateral References, 
Construction and application of statutes 
creating presumption or other inference of 
intoxication from specified percentages of 
alcohol present in system, 16 ALR 3d 748. 
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Duty of law enforcement officer to offer 
suspect chemical sobriety test under implied 
consent law, 95 ALR 3d 710. 
Necessity and sufficiency of proof that tests 
of blood alcohol concentration were con-
ducted in conformance with prescribed 
methods, 96 ALR 3d 745. 
Request before submitting to chemical 
sobriety test to communicate with counsel as 
refusal to take test, 97 ALR 3d 852. 
Request for prior administration of addi-
tional test as constituting refusal to submit 
to chemical sobriety test under implied con-
sent law, 98 ALR 3d 572. 
Law Reviews. 
The Status of Implied Consent Legislation 
Since Schmerber v. California, 1967 Utah L. 
Rev.168. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Construction and application. 
A person is deemed to give his consent to a 
chemical test of some one of the designated 
substances, breath, blood, urine, or saliva, 
but not all of them; and where a motorist, 
arrested by an officer on the suspicion of 
being intoxicated, was advised that he must 
submit to a blood test or his license would be 
revoked, it was not in accordance with the 
statute and there was no proper basis for 
revoking his license. Ringwood v. State (1959) 
8 U 2d 287, 333 P 2d 943. 
Evidence. 
Prior to the enactment of this section it 
was held, in an action against the estate of a 
deceased for injuries arising out of an auto-
mobile accident, that the testimony of a 
doctor who made a blood test from blood 
taken from the deceased's body without the 
consent of the deceased's parents was admis-
sible in evidence. Fretz v. Anderson (1956) 5 
U 2d 290, 300 P 2d 642. 
Refusal to submit to test. 
Where arrested motorist did not take a 
test because of his having taken time to 
reach his attorney and make up his mind 
whether to submit, he had not "refused a 
chemical test" and order revoking his 
driver's license was not authorized. Hunter v. 
Dorius (1969) 23 U 2d 122, 458 P 2d 877. 
Driver arrested for driving while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquors, advised of 
this law and of his constitutional rights, but 
pretends not to understand, refuses to take 
breathalyzer test, and presents no reasonable 
cause for refusing to submit; has his driver's 
license properly revoked as required by law. 
McCall v. Dorius (1974) 527 P 2d 647. 
The question of revocation of plaintiff's 
driver's license for refusal to submit to a 
blood-alcohol test was rendered moot by the 
failure of the state to provide a "duly author-
ized laboratory technician"; drawing blood 
for the test constitutes the practice of medi-
cine and a technician performing the test is 
not duly authorized unless acting under the 
supervision or direction of a medical practi-
tioner. Gibb v. Dorius (1975) 533 P 2d 299, 
distinguished in 561 P 2d 1056. 
Where, upon arrest for driving while intox-
icated, officer asked defendant whether he 
would submit to a "chemical test," and 
defendant replied that he would take a blood 
test and that he wanted his physician 
present, to both of which requests the officer 
agreed, subsequent failure to take blood test 
due to unavailability of physician and defen-
dant's refusal to submit to breathalyzer test 
administered by arresting officer did not jus-
tify revocation of defendant's license. 
Gassman v. Dorius (1975) 543 P 2d 197. 
Plaintiff who, upon being arrested for driv-
ing while intoxicated, agreed in principle to 
submit to the test required by this section, 
but at police station refused to take it until 
her attorney was present, did not refuse to 
submit within the meaning of the statute 
where it appeared that she called her attor-
ney and he made a bona fide effort to appear 
within a reasonable time, but the police offi-
cer grew tired of waiting and left without 
administering the test; therefore, driver 
license division was not justified in revoking 
plaintiff's license to drive. Peterson v. Dorius 
(1976) 547 P 2d 693. 
Where plaintiff, immediately upon being 
arrested after she was involved in an acci-
dent, and while still agitated and upset, was 
informed of the provisions of the implied 
consent law and replied that the police offi-
cers did not know what they were talking 
about, she did not expressly refuse to take 
the test required by this section, and the 
subsequent suspension of her driver's license 
on that ground was error. Hyde v. Dorius 
(1976) 549 P 2d 451. 
Police officers need not follow exactly the 
sequence of events set out in this section; 
language of statute indicating that notifica-
tion of consequences should be given after 
refusal to submit to test did not impose 
requirement that officer proceed in exactly 
that fashion, and officer's notification to 
defendant of consequences of refusal prior to 
obtaining his answer as to whether he would 
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submit did not constitute noncompliance 
with the statute. Elliott v. Dorius (1976) 557 
P 2d 759, distinguishing 543 P 2d 197. 
The fact that defendant believed the 
breath test to be unreliable, and therefore 
refused to submit to it, did not constitute 
"reasonable cause" for refusal within the 
contemplation of the statute. Elliott v. 
Dorius (1976) 557 P 2d 759. 
41-6-44.20. Drinking alcoholic beverage and open containers in 
motor vehicle prohibited - Definitions - Exceptions - Penalty for 
violation. (1) No person shall drink any alcoholic beverage while driving 
a motor vehicle or while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether the vehi-
cle is moving, stopped, or parked on any street or highway. 
(2) No person shall keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another to 
keep, carry, possess, or transport in the passenger compartment of a motor 
vehicle, when the vehicle is on any public street or highway, any container 
whatsoever which contains any alcoholic beverage if the container has been 
opened, the seal thereon broken, or the contents of the container partially 
consumed. 
(3) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Passenger compartment" means the area of the vehicle normally 
occupied by the driver and his passengers and includes areas accessible to 
them while traveling such as a utility or glove compartment, but does not 
include a separate front or rear trunk compartment or other area of the 
vehicle not accessible to the driver or passengers while inside the vehicle; 
and 
(b) "Alcoholic beverage" shall have the meaning provided in section 
32-1-3. 
(4) The provisions of subsections (1) and (2) shall not apply to passen-
gers in the living quarters of a motor home or camper, but the driver of 
the vehicle will be prohibited from consuming alcoholic beverages as pro-
vided in subsection (1). 
(5) The provisions of subsection (2) shall not apply to passengers 
traveling in any duly licensed taxicab or bus. 
(6) Any person convicted of a violation of this section is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.20, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 272, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to motor vehicles; prohib-
iting consumption of alcoholic beverages in 
motor vehicles; prohibiting open containers 
of alcoholic beverages in passenger areas of 
motor vehicles; and providing exceptions and 
penalties. 
This act enacts section 41-6-44.20, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. - Laws 1981, ch. 272. 
Collateral References. 
7A AmJur 2d 498, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 311. 
Validity of statute or ordinance making it 
an offense to consume or have alcoholic bev-
erages in open package in motor vehicle, 57 
ALR 3d 1071. 
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty. (1) Any person who drives any 
vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property 




TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-46 
(2) Every person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished upon 
a first conviction by imprisonment for a period of not less than five days 
nor more than six months or by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than 
$299, or by both such fine and imprisonment. On a second or subsequent 
conviction, the person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 
ten days nor more than six months, or by a fine of not less than $50 nor 
more than $299 or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 35; C. 1943, 
57-7-112; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 9. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1978 amendment deleted "or on a con-
viction under this section subsequent to a 
conviction under an ordinance as provided in 
section 41-6-43(b)" after "subsequent convic-
tion" near the beginning of the second sen-
tence of subsec. (2); substituted "$299" for 
"$1,000" near the end of subsec. (2); deleted 
the last two sentences of subsec. (2) which 
provided that second violation had to occur 
within three years of the preceding violation 
and for suspension of license by department; 
and made minor changes in phraseology and 
style. 
Former jeopardy. 
Conviction of motorist for reckless driving 
held not bar to subsequent prosecution for 
involuntary manslaughter. State v. Empey 
(1925) 65 U 609, 239 P 25, 44 ALR 558, 
reviewed in State v. Thatcher (1945) 108 U 
63, 157 P 2d 258. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles ~ 330. 
61A CJS Motor Vehicles§§ 609-624. 
Reckless driving, 7A AmJur 2d 499 et seq., 
Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 312 et 
seq. 
"Assured clear distance ahead" or "radius 
of lights" application of doctrine to accident 
involving pedestrian crossing street or high-
way, 31 ALR 2d 1424. 
Excuse for exceeding speed limit for auto-
mobiles, 29 ALR 883. 
Homicide or assault in connection with 
operation of automobile at unlawful speed, 99 
ALR 756. 
Liability of one fleeing police for injury 
resulting from collision of police vehicle with 
another vehicle, person, or object, 51 ALR 3d 
1226. 
"Residence district," "business district," 
"school area," and the like, in statutes and 
ordinances regulating speed of motor vehi-
cles, 50 ALR 2d 343. 
Statute prohibiting reckless driving; defi-
niteness and certainty, 12 ALR 2d 580. 
Validity, construction, and application of 
criminal statutes specifically directed against 
racing of automobiles on public streets or 
highways (drag racing), 24 ALR 3d 1286. 
Validity of statute or ordinance forbidding 
running of automobile so as to inflict damage 
or injury, 47 ALR 255. 
What amounts to reckless driving, 86 ALR 
1273, 52 ALR 2d 1337. 













Speed regulations - Safe and appropriate speeds at intersections, crossings, and 
curves - Prima facie speed limits - Emergency power of the governor. 
Prima facie limit. 
Speed Restrictions - Powers of local authorities. 
Minimum speed regulations. 
Special speed limit on bridges - Prima facie evidence. 
Speed contest or exhibition on highway - Barricade or obstruction therefor. 
Violation - Pleading. 
Repealed. 
41-6-46. Speed regulations - Safe and appropriate speeds at inter-
sections, crossings, and curves - Prima facie speed limits - Emer-
gency power of the governor. (1) No person shall drive a vehicle at a 
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speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and 
having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. Consistent 
with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed 
when approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, 
when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, 
when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when special 
hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of 
weather or highway conditions. 
(2) Where no special hazard exists the following speeds shall be lawful 
but any speed in excess of said limits shall be prima facie evidence that 
the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful: 
(a) Twenty miles per hour. 
When passing a school building or the grounds thereof during school 
recess or while children are going to or leaving school during opening or 
closing hours; provided, that local authorities may require a complete stop 
before passing a school building or grounds at any of said periods. 
(b) Twenty-five miles per hour in any urban district. 
(c) Fifty-five miles per hour in other locations. 
The speed limits set forth in this section may be altered as authorized 
in subsection (3) and sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48. 
(3) The governor by proclamation, in time of war or emergency, may 
change the speed on the highways of the state. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-46, enacted by L. 
1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1 repealed old 
section 41-6-46 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 36; C. 1943, 
57-7-113; L. 1951, ch. 72, § 1; 1957, ch. 76, § 1; 
1959, ch. 66, § 1; 1978, ch. 34, § 1), relating to 
speed regulations, and enacted new section 
41-6-46. 
Title of Act. 
An act repealing and re-enacting section 
41-6-46, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended by chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1957, 
as amended by chapter 66, Laws of Utah 
1959, as amended by chapter 34, Laws of 
Utah 1978, and section 41-2-19, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 85, 
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by chapter 
34, Laws of Utah 1978; relating to highway 
speeds and points for certain speeding 
offenses; providing for maximum speeds; pro-
viding for suspensions of licenses for certain 
offenses; providing for the assessment of 
points for certain violations and the basis for 
and effect of such points; providing for new 
licensure after suspension; and providing for 
hearings and re-examinations. - Laws 1978 
(2nd S.S.), ch. 9. 
Cross-References. 
Municipal regulations, 10-8-30. 
Reckless driving, 41-6-45. 
Construction and application. 
This section requires that driver shall not 
drive at speed greater than is reasonable and 
prudent in view of existing conditions and 
hazards on highway, that his speed shall be 
controlled so as to avoid colliding with other 
vehicles entering or upon highway in lawful 
manner, and that speed shall be appropri-
ately reduced when special hazards exist 
with respect to other traffic or by reason of 
weather conditions. Horsley v. Robinson 
(1947) 112 U 227, 186 P 2d 592. 
Constitutionality. 
A former speed law was held constitutional 
as against contention that it violated Const. 
Art. VI, § 23. State v. Brown (1928) 75 U 37, 
282 P 785. 
Former jeopardy. 
Conviction of motorist charged with 
speeding under this section does not bar 
subsequent prosecution for involuntary man-
slaughter. State v. Thatcher (1945) 108 U 63, · 
157 P 2d 258. 
Instructions. 
In action arising out of car-pedestrian acci-
dent in California, evidence did not justify 
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instruction that defendant had duty to drive 
car in conformity with California statute 
providing that no person shall drive vehicle 
at speed greater than is reasonable and pru-
dent, where there was no evidence that 
defendant's speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour 
was excessive or unreasonable. (Deering's 
Cal. Vehicle Code § 510.) Hunter v. Michaelis 
(1948) 114 U 242, 198 P 2d 245. 
Where defendant failed to see small child 
in the street until it was too late to avoid 
striking him, the trial court should have 
instructed jury that driver is charged with 
duty of seeing what he would have seen had 
he been exercising reasonable care, since evi-
dence showed motorist should have seen the 
child much sooner; instructing jury on right 
to assume others will perform their legal 
duties and on sudden or unexpected situation 
arising without fault on defendant's part was 
reversible error. Solt v. Godfrey (1971) 25 U 
2d 210, 479 P 2d 474. 
Motor carriers and buses. 
Driver of vehicle carrying passengers for 
hire owes them duty to operate vehicle 
within such rate of speed as reasonably pru-
dent person would operate under existing 
conditions, and, where road and weather con-
ditions make driving hazardous, reasonable 
prudence requires proportionate increase in 
care of driver to avoid injury to passengers. 
Horsley v. Robinson (1947) 112 U 227, 186 P 
2d592. 
Where bus, while traveling between 20 and 
50 miles per hour under very hazardous con-
ditions on outside lane of main highway 
which was covered with ice and slush, col-
lided with automobile approaching from 
opposite direction which went out of control 
and skidded into path of bus, and distance 
between bus and automobile, when it first 
became discernible that latter was out of 
control, was between 30 and 3,30 feet, evi-
dence was sufficient to sustain verdict in 
favor of injured bus passenger for hire as 
against bus company, in that jury could con-
clude therefrom that bus driver was negli-
gent in operating bus at excessive rate of 
speed under such circumstances, which was 
proximate cause of collision. Horsley v. 
Robinson (1947) 112 U 227, 186 P 2d 592. 
Negligence. 
Ordinarily it is not negligence to operate a 
motor vehicle within the speed limit pre-
scribed by statute or ordinance, although a 
jury may say in some instances, dependent 
upon the particular attendant facts and cir-
cumstances, that the operation of an automo-
bile within prescribed limit is nevertheless 
negligence. Lochhead v. Jensen (1912) 42 U 
99, 129 P 347. 
Violation of speed regulations may consti-
tute negligence per se. Jensen v. Utah Light 
& Railway Co. (1913) 42 U 415, 132 P 8. 
Operating a motor vehicle at less than the 
lawful maximum speed may constitute negli-
gence under given circumstances. Fowkes v. 
J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. (1915) 46 U 
502, 151 P 53. 
It has long been the rule in this state that 
it is negligence as a matter of law to drive an 
automobile upon a traveled public highway 
at such rate of speed that said automobile 
cannot be stopped within distance at which 
opera tor of said car is able to see objects 
upon highway in front of him. Dalley v. Mid-
western Dairy Products Co. (1932) 80 U 331, 
15 P 2d 309. 
When a driver upon a public highway with 
his light equipment cannot see more than 50 
feet ahead of him, it is his duty to drive at 
such speed as will enable him to stop within 
that distance. Hansen v. Clyde (1936) 89 U 31, 
56 P 2d 1366, 104 ALR 943. 
For general discussion as to speed and civil 
liability with respect thereto, see opinions by 
Wade, Wolfe and Pratt, JJ., in Horsley v. 
Robinson (1947) 112 U 227, 186 P 2d 592. 
Where fog was so great that visibility was 
limited to 20 or 25 feet and a safe speed 
under those conditions was about five miles 
per hour, the court cannot say as a matter of 
law that the plaintiff was not negligent in 
operating his car at the rate of 25 miles per 
hour. Shields v. Ramon (1952) 122 U 474, 251 
P 2d 671. 
What is a reasonable and prudent speed 
under the conditions and having regard to 
the actual and potential hazards then exist-
ing is a matter about which there is room for 
reasonable disagreement and such being the 
case, a jury question is presented. Lodder v. 
Western Pac. R. Co. {1953) 123 U 316, 259 P 
2d 589. 
Driving in excess of speed limit may con-
stitute prima facie evidence of negligence, 
but does not constitute conclusive evidence. 
Cardon v. Brenchley (1978) 575 P 2d 184. 
Pleadings and proceedings. 
If the complaint is fatally defective in its 
allegations when viewed as an attempt to 
bring defendant within the provisions of this 
section, judgment for plaintiff will be 
reversed. Woodward v. Spring Canyon Coal 
Co. (1936) 90 U 578, 63 P 2d 267. 
Questions of law and fact. 
Whether the speed at which the vehicle 
was going at the time was the proximate 
cause of the accident is a question of fact. 
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Sweet v. Salt Lake City (1913) 43 U 306, 134 P 
1167. 
In action arising out of intersection colli-
sion, evidence sufficiently established prima 
facie case of negligence on part of defendant 
in failing to yield right-of-way and in travel-
ing at excessive rate of speed, and contribu-
tory negligence on part of plaintiff in failing 
to keep proper lookout and in traveling at 
excessive rate of speed was for jury. Martin 
v. Sheffield (1948) 112 U 478, 189 P 2d 127. 
In action against motorist for death of 
decedent, who was killed while hitching 
small tractor to rear of an automobile, it was 
a question of fact for the jury whether 
motorist was negligent in failing to reduce 
her speed below 50 miles per hour when she 
saw wrecker ahead of her on the highway. 
Taylor v. Johnson (1964) 15 U 2d 342, 393 P 
2d 382. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles P 331. 
61A CJS Motor Vehicles §§ 641-650. 
Speed, 7A AmJur 2d 394 et seq., Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 218 et seq. 
Application of "assured clear distance 
ahead" or "radius of lights" doctrine to acci-
dent involving pedestrian crossing street or 
highway, 31 ALR 2d 1424. 
"Assured clear distance" statute or rule as 
applied at hill or curve, 133 ALR 967. 
Competency of nonexpert's testimony 
based on sound alone as to speed of motor 
vehicle involved in accident, 33 ALR 3d 1405. 
Conflict between statutes and local regula-
tions as to speed, 21 ALR 1187, 64 ALR 994, 
147 ALR529. 
Criminal or penal responsibility of public 
officer or employee for violating speed regu-
lations, 9 ALR 367. 
Driving at illegal speed as reckless driving 
within statute making reckless driving a 
criminal offense, 86 ALR 1281, 52 ALR 2d 
1337. 
Driving automobile at a speed which pre-
vents stopping within length of vision as 
negligence, 44 ALR 1403, 58 ALR 1493, 87 
ALR 900, 97 ALR 546. 
Excuse for exceeding speed limit for auto-
mobiles, 29 ALR 883. 
Expert opinion evidence of speed not based 
upon view of vehicle, 156 ALR 382. 
Homicide or assault in connection with 
operation of automobile at unlawful speed, 99 
ALR 756. 
Indefiniteness of automobile speed regula-
tions as affecting validity, 6 ALR 3d 1326. 
Indictment or information which charges 
offense as to speed in language of statute, 115 
ALR357. 
Liability of public authority for injury 
arising out of automobile race conducted on 
street or highway, 80 ALR 3d 1192. 
Meaning of "residence district," "business 
district," "school area," and the like, in stat-
utes and ordinances · regulating speed of 
motor vehicles, 50 ALR 2d 343. 
Opinion testimony as to speed of motor 
vehicle based on skid marks and other facts, 
29 ALR 3d 248. 
Proof, by radar or other mechanical or 
electronic devices, of violation of speed regu-
lations, 47 ALR 3d 822. 
Public officers or employees as bound by 
speed regulations, 19 ALR 459, 23 ALR 418. 
Speeding prosecution based on observation 
from aircraft, 23 ALR 3d 1446. 
Validity, construction, and application of 
criminal statutes specifically directed against 
racing of automobiles on public streets or 
highways (drag racing), 24 ALR 3d 1286. 
Violation of speed law as affecting 
violator's right to recover for negligence, 12 
ALR463. 
Violation of speed regulations as affecting 
rights to recover for injuries due to collision 
with streetcar, 28 ALR 228, 46 ALR 1008. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
National emergency. 
"National emergency" as used in former 
provision authorizing governor to change 
speed limit by proclamation meant an 
unforeseen combination of circumstances 
calling for immediate action by national 
leaders and support from citizens for the 
safety, peace, health and general welfare of 
the nation; the 1973 Arab oil embargo was 
such an emergency and governor could 
validly reduce state-wide speed limit to 55 
miles per hour by proclamation. State v. 
Foukas (1977) 560 P 2d 312. 
Validly issued proclamation by governor 
setting speed limit could be terminated by 
governor's proclamation, by legislative 
action, or by judicial holding that the -cir-
cumstances had so changed that the procla-
mation could no longer serve any useful pur-
pose; governor's proclamation limiting speed 
limit to 55 miles per hour had not been 
terminated as of December 2, 1976. In re 
Prisbrey (1978) 576 P 2d 1278. 
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41-6-47. Prima facie limit. Whenever the department of transporta-
tion shall determine upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investiga-
tion that any prima facie speed hereinbefore set forth is greater or less 
than is reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at any inter-
section or other place or upon any part of a state highway, said department 
of transportation may determine and declare a reasonable and safe prima 
facie speed limit thereat which shall be effective when appropriate signs 
giving notice thereof are erected at such intersection or other place or part 
of the highway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 37; C. 1943, 
57-7-114; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1979, ch. 242, 
§ 13. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1955 amendment inserted "state" 
before "highway." 
The 1979 amendment substituted "depart-
ment of transportation" for references to the 
state road commission in two places. 
State-wide speed reduction. 
State road commission had no authority 
under this section to pass ordinanc,i reducing 
state-wide speed limit to 55 miles per hour in 
response to President's request without engi-
neering or traffic investigation or finding that 
prior limit was unreasonable or unsafe. State 
v. Foukas (1977) 560 P 2d 312. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles <S=;:> 331. 
61A CJS Motor Vehicles§§ 641-650. 
Speed, 7A AmJur 2d 394 et seq., Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 218 et seq. 
41-6-48. Speed Restrictions - Powers of local authorities. 
(1) Whenever local authorities in their respective jurisdiction determine 
on the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that the prima facie 
speed permitted under this article is greater or less than is reasonable and 
safe under the conditions found to exist upon a highway or part of a high-
way, the local authority may determine and declare a reasonable and safe 
prima facie limit thereon which: 
(a) Decreases the limit at intersections; or 
(b) Increases the limit within an urban district; or 
(c) Decreases the limit outside an urban district, but not to less than 
35 miles per hour. 
(2) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions shall determine by 
an engineering and traffic investigation the proper prima facie speed for 
all arterial streets and shall declare a reasonable and safe prima f acie 
limit thereon which may be greater or less than the prima facie speed per-
mitted under this chapter for an urban district. 
(3) Any altered limit established as herein above authorized shall be 
effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected upon 
such street or highway. 
( 4) The department of transportation shall have exclusive authority to 
determine and declare prima facie evidence of a lawful speed on state high-
ways whether such highways be within or without the corporate limits of 
any city. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-48, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1975, ch. 207, § 13; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 10. Laws 1975, ch. 207, § 14 repealed old 
section 41-6-48 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 38; C. 1943, 
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57-7-115; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1951 (1st S.S.), 
ch. 12, § 1; 1957, ch. 77, § 1; 1973, ch. 81, § 3), 
relating to speed restrictions and powers of 
local authorities, and enacted new section 
41-6-48. 
The 1978 amendment deleted "in conform-
ance to the current approved 'Utah Manual 
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices"' at the 
end of subsec. (3); deleted former subsecs. (d) 
and (e) which read: "(d) Whenever there is a 
drop of ten (10) miles per hour or more in the 
posted speed limit, it shall be preceded by a 
sign giving advance notice of such a reduc-
tion. Such signs shall be as specified in the 
current approved 'Utah Manual on Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices.' (e) No local author-
ity shall have the authority to modify or 
alter the basic rule set forth in subdivision 
(a) subsection (2) of section 41-6-46"; substi-
tuted "department of transportation" near 
the beginning of subsec. (4) for "state road 
commission"; and made minor changes in 
phraseology and style. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles P 168(1). 
60 CJS Motor Vehicles § 290. 
7A AmJur 2d 395, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 219. 
Conflict between statutes and local regula-
tions as to automobiles, 21 ALR 1186, 64 ALR 
993,147 ALR 522. 
Constitutionality of legislative delegation 
of powers to prescribe or vary regulations 
concerning motor vehicles used on highways, 
87 ALR 546. 
Traffic regulations, failure of municipality 
to adopt or enforce as ground of its liability 
for damage to property or person, 92 ALR 
1495, 161 ALR 1404. 
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations. (a) No person shall drive a 
motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede or block the normal and 
reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for 
safe operation or because upon a grade or in compliance with law; provided 
that operating a motor vehicle on a controlled-access highway at less than 
the lawful maximum speed in a left-lane side by side and at the same speed 
as a vehicle operated in the adjacent right-lane shall constitute evidence 
of impeding or blocking normal movement of traffic, except when a reduced 
speed is necessary because the left-lane is the approach lane of an exit 
ramp or because of congested traffic, adverse weather, or in compliance 
with official traffic-control devices. 
(b) Whenever the department of transportation or local authorities 
within their respective jurisdictions determine on the basis of an engineer-
ing and traffic investigation that slow speeds on any part of a highway 
consistently impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, the 
department of transportation or such local authority may determine and 
shall post a minimum speed limit below which no person shall drive a vehi-
cle except when necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 39; C. 1943, 
57-7-116; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1967, ch. 89, § 1; 
1969, ch. 108, § 1; 1979, ch. 242, § 14. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1955 amendment added subsec. (b); 
and made a minor change in phraseology. 
The 1967 amendment deleted a second 
paragraph from subsec. (a) which authorized 
police officers to enforce the provision by 
directions to drivers and provided that 
willful disobedience of the provision or 
refusal to comply with direction of an officer 
constituted a misdemeanor. 
The 1969 amendment added the proviso to 
subsec. (a). 
The 1979 amendment substituted "con-
trolled-access highway" for "limited-access 
highway" in subsec. (a); and substituted 
"department of transportation" for refer-
ences to the state road commission in two 
places in subsec. (b). 
Cross-References. 
Slow-moving vehicle, 41-6-138. 
"Utah Horseless Carriage" exempt, 
41-21-3. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles P 324. 
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61 CJS Motor Vehicles§ 588. Civil cases involving law against slow 
7A AmJur 2d 401, Automobiles and High- speed, 66 ALR 2d 1194. 
way Traffic § 228 . 
. 41-6-50. Special speed limit on bridges - Prima facie evidence. 
(1) No person shall drive a vehicle over any bridge or other elevated 
structure constituting a part of a highway at a speed which is greater than 
the maximum speed which can be maintained with safety to such bridge 
or structure, when such structure is signposted as provided in this section. 
(2) The department of transportation upon request from any local 
authority shall, or upon its own initiative, may conduct an investigation 
of any bridge or other elevated structure constituting a part of a highway, 
and if it finds that such structure cannot with safety withstand vehicles 
traveling at the speed otherwise permissible under this chapter, the 
department of transportation shall determine and declare the maximum 
speed of vehicles which such structure can withstand, and shall cause or 
permit suitable signs stating such maximum speed to be erected and main-
tained before each end of such structure. 
(3) Upon the trial of any person charged with a violation of this 
section, proof of said determination of the maximum speed by the depart-
ment of transportation and the existence of said signs shall constitute con-
clusive evidence of the maximum speed which can be maintained with 
safety to such bridge or structure. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 40; C. 1943, 
57-7-117; L.1978, ch. 33, § 11. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1978 amendment substituted refer-
ences to the department of transportation for 
references to the state road commission in 
three places; deleted "at a distance of 100 
feet" after "maintained" near the end of 
subsec. (2); and made minor changes in 
phraseology and style. 
Collateral References. 
Collision between automobiles on bridge or 
approach thereto, 118 ALR 1196. 
41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway - Barricade or 
obstruction therefor. (a) No person shall engage in any motor vehicle 
speed contest or exhibition of speed on a highway and no person shall aid 
or abet in any such motor vehicle speed contest or exhibition on any high-
way. 
(b) No person shall, for the purpose of facilitating or aiding or as an 
incident to any motor vehicle speed contest upon a highway, in any manner 
obstruct or place any barricade or obstruction or assist or participate in 
placing any such barricade or obstruction upon any highway. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-118.10, enacted by 7 A AmJur 2d 508, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 323. L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles <S=o 6. 
61A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 641(1). 
Validity, construction, and application of 
criminal statutes, specifically directed 
against racing of automobiles on public 
streets or highways (drag racing), 24 ALR 3d 
1286. 
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41-6-52. Violation - Pleading. (a) In every charge of violation of any 
speed regulation in this act the complaint, also the summons or notice to 
appear, shall specify the speed at which the defendant is alleged to have 
driven, also the prima facie speed applicable within the district or at the 
location. 
(b) The provisions of this act declaring prima facie speed limitations 
shall not be construed to relieve the plaintiff in any civil action from the 
burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant as the proximate 
cause of an accident. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 42; C. 1943, 
57-7-119. 
61A CJS Motor Vehicles § 588. 
7 A AmJur 2d 406, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 231. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles e:,, 351. 
41-6-52.1. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Section 41-6-52.1 (L. 1957, ch. 77, § 2), relat-
ing to resume speed road signs, was repealed 

















REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO DRIVING ON 
RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY, OVERTAKING, PASSING 
AND OTH&1"! RULES OF THE ROAD 
Duty to drive on right side of highway - Exceptions. 
Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite directions. 
Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in same direction. 
Passing upon right - When permissible. 
Limitation on passing. 
Limitations on driving on left side of road - Exceptions. 
Signs and markings on roadway - No passing zones - Exceptions. 
One-way traffic - Signs. 
Roadway divided into marked lanes - Rules - Traffic-control devices. 
Following another vehicle - Proximity and distance - Caravan or motorcade 
- Exception for funeral procession. 
Repealed. 
Highway divided into two separate roadways by dividing section - Unlawful 
actions of drivers - Dividing section defined and described. 
Controlled-access highways - Driving upon and from highways. 
Controlled-access highways - Prohibiting use by class or kind of traffic - Traf-
fic-control devices. 
41-6-53. Duty to drive on right side of highway - Exceptions. 
(a) Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon 
the right half of the roadway, except as follows: 
(1) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction under the rules governing such movement; 
(2) When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left 
of the center of the roadway; provided any person so doing shall yield the 
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right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unob-
structed portions of the highway within such distance as to constitute an 
immediate hazard; 
(3) Upon a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under 
the rules applicable thereon; or 
(4) Upon a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic. 
(b) Upon all roadways any vehicle proceeding at less than the normal 
speed of traffic at the time and place under the conditions then existing 
shall be driven in the right-hand lane then available for traffic, or as close 
as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, except when 
overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction 
or when preparing for a left turn at an intersection or into a private road 
or driveway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 43; C. 1943, 
57-7-120; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 14. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment added subsec. (b). 
The 1975 amendment rewrote subd. (a)(2) 
which read: "When the right half of a road-
way is closed to traffic while under construc-
tion or repair." 
Construction and application. 
Where this section refers to "half the road-
ways," the reasonable interpretation of the 
meaning of this term is that it means half of 
the roadway as it exists at the time it is 
being traveled and not half the roadway as it 
may have been laid out originally. To this 
effect see Dixon v. Alabam Freight Co. (1941) 
57 Ariz 173, 112 P 2d 584, in which the Ari-
zona court construed sections similar to ours 
as quoted above. Patton v. Kirkman (1946) 
109 U 487, 167 P 2d 282. 
Backing. 
Statutes requiring that vehicles keep to 
right have no application to backing. Naisbitt 
v. Eggett (1956) 5 U 2d 5, 295 P 2d 832. 
Bicycle and truck. 
Driver of autotruck who was on right side 
of street and was not on, near to, or 
approaching crossing where both vehicles 
and pedestrians might pass either or both 
ways, had right to relax his vigilance and 
was not required to do more than to main-
tain such lookout as would prevent his collid-
ing or coming in contact with anyone on his 
side of street. Richards v. Palace Laundry Co. 
(1919) 55 U 409, 186 P 439. 
Effect of passing from right to center. 
While in case street or highway is not used 
by others one may drive on any part thereof, 
yet, when motorist or bicyclist passes from 
right to left of center of street, he loses some 
of his rights, and may not be heard to com-
plain of conduct of those who are on proper 
side of street to same extent as though he 
also were on proper side. Richards v. Palace 
Laundry Co. (1919) 55 U 409, 186 P 439. 
Instruction. 
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries 
sustained as result of collision with automo-
bile at intersection, instruction that motorist 
had right to presume that every other person 
would obey law by traveling on right-hand 
side of road, and that no duty rested upon 
motorist to stop or change course of automo-
bile until he had reason to believe that plain-
tiff was traveling on wrong side of street, 
was properly refused where it was disputed 
question as to whether bicyclist was on 
wrong side of roadway. Cheney v. Buck (1920) 
56 U 29, 189 P 81. 
Where collision takes place upon street 
having four traffic lanes, it is proper to 
instruct as to duty of defendant to use right 
traffic lane, and as to duty of the respective 
parties to use lane 4 rather than lane 3, 
where the evidence warrants such instruc-
tion. Thomas v. Sadleir (1945) 108 U 552, 162 
P 2d 112, setting out instruction, embodying 
this section of the Motor Vehicle Law and 
the exceptions, and held to be nonprejudicial 
and not objectionable as stating the last 
clear chance doctrine. 
Negligence. 
The strongest kind of presumption of 
negligence prevails against party driving on 
wrong side of road. Staton v. Western Maca-
roni Mfg. Co. (1918) 52 U 426, 174 P 821. 
Where one who is operating his vehicle on 
right-hand side of street makes survey of 
condition of street ahead of him, and in 
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doing so he observes no one coming on his 
side of street, but sees one or more coming 
towards him on opposite side of street, he 
has right to assume that such person will 
continue onward on opposite side of street, 
and not encroach upon his side. Richards v. 
Palace Laundry Co. (1919) 55 U 409, 186 P 
439. 
Presumption. 
In action by bicyclist for injuries sustained 
in collision with autotruck when plaintiff was 
thrown in front of defendant's oncoming 
vehicle, held driver of autotruck had legal 
right to presume that plaintiff would not 
encroach upon his side of street, and to hold 
defendant liable, plaintiff was required to 
prove more than mere fact that autotruck 
could have been stopped or turned aside in 
distance of 10 or 15 feet. Richards v. Palace 
Laundry Co. (1919) 55 U 409, 186 P 439. 
Questions of law and fact. 
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries 
sustained as result of collision with automo-
bile at intersection, whether bicyclist was on 
right side of traveled road held for jury. 
Cheney v. Buck (1920) 56 U 29, 189 P 81. 
In personal-injury action arising out of 
automobile-truck collision on highway, ulti-
mate question of fact as to which of two driv-
ers failed to keep his vehicle upon proper side 
of road was for jury. Moser v. Zion's Co-op. 
Mercantile Institution (1948) 114 U 58, 197 P 
2d 136. 
Violation as prima facie evidence of negli-
gence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by 
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence 
of negligence subject only to justification or 
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F 
Supp 254. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles cS=> 153. 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 268. 
Portion of highway to be used; following, 
approaching, and passing other vehicles, 7A 
AmJur 2d 434 et seq., Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 260 et seq. 
Duties imposed by statute where motor 
vehicle, passing on left of other vehicle pro-
ceeding in same direction, cuts back to the 
right, 48 ALR 2d 233. 
Right or duty to turn in violation of law of 
road to avoid traveler or obstacle, 24 ALR 
1304, 63 ALR 277, 113 ALR 1328. 
Validity of regulations as to part of street 
to be used by moving vehicles, 29 ALR 1348. 
41-6-54. Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite directions. Drivers 
of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the 
right and upon roadways having width for not more than one line of traffic 
in each direction, each driver shall give to the other at least one-half of 
the main traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as possible. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 44; C. 1943, 
57-7-121. 
Construction and application. 
Where this section refers to half the road-
way, it means half of the roadway as it exists 
at the time it is being traveled, and not half 
the roadway as it may have been laid out 
originally. Patton v. Kirkman (1946) 109 U 
487, 167 P 2d 282, following Dixon v. Alabam 
Freight Co. (1941) 57 Ariz 173, 112 P 2d 584, 
construing similar section of the statutes of 
that state. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles cS=> 170(2). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 306. 
Vehicles proceeding in opposite directions, 
7A AmJur 2d 442, Automobiles and Highway 
Traffic § 265; 7 A AmJur 2d 1100 et seq., Auto-
mobiles and Highway Traffic§ 839 et seq. 
41-6-55. Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in same direc-
tion. The following rules shall govern the overtaking and passing of vehi-
cles proceeding in the same direction, subject to those limitations, 
exceptions, and special rules hereinafter stated: 
(a) The driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction shall pass to the left thereof at a safe distance and shall 
not again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the 
overtaken vehicle. 
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(b) Except when overtaking and passing on the right is permitted, the 
driver of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to the right in favor of the 
overtaking vehicle on audible signal and shall not increase the speed of 
his vehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 45; C. 1943, 
57-7-122. 
Construction and application. 
The rule, whether statutory or decisional, 
which requires driver of vehicle overtaking 
another proceeding in same direction to pass 
to the left at a safe distance, imposes a high 
degree of care commensurate with the cir-
cumstances involved. The driver attempts to 
pass at his peril, and the situation facing him 
must be such as to reasonably assure an ordi-
narily prudent driver that the passing can be 
accomplished with safety to all occupants of 
the road. Maragakis v. United States (1949) 
172 F 2d 393. 
In action for wrongful death of eleven-
year-old boy, two instructions, one based on 
subsec. (b) of this section, the other, con-
forming with subsec. (a) of 41-6-146, to the 
effect that driver of vehicle intending to pass 
another vehicle does not, under all circum-
stances, owe duty of sounding horn, but 
sounding of horn is left to judgment of oper-
ator in exercise of due care, were not incon-
sistent, where instructions dealt with differ-
ent fact situations. Manning v. Powers (1950) 
117 U 310, 215 P 2d 396. 
Duty to sound horn. 
Instruction that driver of automobile had 
no duty to sound horn upon attempting to 
pass another vehicle was objectionable on 
basis that while there is no general duty to 
sound his horn, driver does have duty to give 
audible warning of approach and intention to 
pass where it would appear from all circum-
stances that such warning is reasonably 
necessary to ensure safe operation. Barton v. 
Jensen (1967) 19 U 2d 196, 429 P 2d 44. 
Evidence. 
In action under Federal Tort Claims Act, 
evidence disclosed that driver of government 
vehicle failed to exercise due care in placing 
himself in position of peril by attempting to 
pass to the left of plaintiffs' vehicle. 
Maragakis v. United States (1949) 172 F 2d 
393. 
Questions of law and fact. 
Whether defendant violated this section by 
passing on wrong side of road and failing to 
s~und his horn is question of ~act ordinarily. 
Fowkes v. J. I. Case Threshmg Mach. Co. 
(1915) 46 U 502, 151 P 53. 
Violation as prima facie evidence of negli-
gence. 
Violation of standards of safety set by 
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence 
of negligence subject only to justification or 
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F 
Supp 254, affirmed in 409 F 2d 1009. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles cS=:> 172(2). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 326. 
7A AmJur 2d 436-442, Automobiles and 
Highway Traffic §§ 262-265. 
Duties imposed by statute where motor 
vehicle, passing on left of other vehicle pro-
ceeding in same direction, cuts back to the 
right, 48 ALR 2d 233. 
Duty and liability of overtaken driver with 
respect to adjusting speed to that of passing 
vehicle, 91 ALR 2d 1260. 
Giving audible signal where driver's view 
ahead is obstructed at curve or hill, duty and 
liability with respect to, 16 ALR 3d 897. 
Reciprocal duties of driver of automobiles 
or other vehicles proceeding in same direc-
tion, 24 ALR 507, 47 ALR 703, 62 ALR 970, 
104 ALR 485. 
Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities 
where driver of motor vehicle attempts to 
pass on right of other motor vehicle proceed-
ing in same direction, 38 ALR 2d 114. 
Rights and liabilities as between drivers of 
motor vehicles proceeding in same direction, 
where one or both attempt to pass on left of 
another vehicle so proceeding, 27 ALR 2d 317. 
41-6-56. Passing upon right - When permissible. (1) The driver of 
a vehicle may overtake and pass upon the right of another vehicle only 
under the following conditions: 
(a) When the vehicle overtaken is making or about to make a left turn; 
(b) Upon a roadway with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for 
two or more lines of vehicles moving lawfully in the direction being trav-
eled by the overtaking vehicle; 
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(c) Upon a one-way street, or upon any roadway on which traffic is 
restricted to one direction of movement, where the roadway is free from 
obstructions and of sufficient width for two or more lines of moving vehi-
cles. 
(2) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass another vehicle upon 
the right only under conditions permitting such movement with safety. 
Such movement shall not be made by driving off the roadway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 46; C. 1943, 
57-7-123; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1978, ch. 33, § 12. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment added subds. (l)(b) 
and (lXc); and rewrote subsec. (2) which 
read: ''The driver of a vehicle may overtake 
and, allowing sufficient clearance, pass 
another vehicle proceeding in the same direc-
tion either upon the left or upon the right on 
a roadway with unobstructed pavement of 
sufficient width for four or more lines of 
moving traffic when such movement can be 
made in safety." 
The 1978 amendment deleted "not occupied 
by parked vehicles" after "pavement" near 
the beginning of subd. (l)(b); substituted 
"vehicles moving lawfully in the direction 
being traveled by the overtaking vehicle" at 
the end of subd. (l)(b) for "moving vehicles 
in each direction"; deleted "allowing suffi-
cient clearance" before "pass" near the 
beginning of the subsec. (2); and made minor 
changes in phraseology, punctuation and 
style. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles cS=:> 172(2). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 326. 
7A AmJur 2d 442, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 265. 
Collision between automobile making 
U-turn and another vehicle, liability arising 
from, 6 ALR 2d 1244. 
Cutting corners as negligence, 115 ALR 
1178. 
Failure of motorist to give signal for left 
turn between intersections, liability for acci-
dent arising from, 39 ALR 2d 103. 
Operation of statutory regulation where 
driver of motor vehicle attempts to pass on 
right of other vehicle proceeding in same 
direction, 38 ALR 2d 123. 
Passing vehicle, duty and liability of over-
taken driver with respect to adjusting speed 
to that of, 91 ALR 2d 1260. 
Right of way at street or highway intersec-
tions, 21 ALR 974, 37 ALR 493, 47 ALR 595. 
Violation of regulation requiring one 
intending to turn left at intersection to 
approach in traffic lane nearest to center of 
street or.highway, 87 ALR 1165. 
Violation of statute by motorist's failure to 
give signal for left turn at intersection with 
respect to motor vehicle proceeding in same 
direction, 39 ALR 2d 32. 
41-6-57. Limitation on passing. No vehicle shall be driven to the left 
side of the center of the roadway in overtaking or passing another vehicle 
proceeding in the same direction unless such left side is clearly visible and 
is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such 
overtaking and passing to be completely made without interfering with the 
operation of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction of any 
vehicle overtaken. In every event the overtaking vehicle must return to an 
authorized lane of travel as soon as practical and in the event that the 
passing movement involves the use of a lane authorized for vehicles 
approaching in the opposite direction before coming within 200 feet of any 
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 47; C. 1943, 
57-7-124; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 15. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1975 amendment substituted "over-
taking or passing" for "overtaking and pass-
ing" near the beginning of the first sentence; 
deleted "safe" before "operation of any vehi-
cle approaching" in the first sentence; and 
substituted "return to an authorized lane * * 
* before coming within 200 feet of any vehi-
cle" in the second sentence for "return to the 
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right-hand side of the roadway before com-
ing within 100 feet of any vehicle." 
Application. 
Vehicles are not always prohibited from 
using their left side of the highway; and 
when they do so in conformity with law and 
in due care, it is not negligence. Thus where 
defendant turned his car to the left in order 
to see around a truck and see if it were clear 
to pass, and was then struck by plaintiff's car 
coming in the opposite direction, it was not 
negligence on the defendant's part. Weenig 
Bros. v. Manning (1953) 1 U 2d 101, 262 P 2d 
491. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles P 172(2). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 326. 
7A AmJur 2d 436, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 262. 
Construction, applicability, and effect of 
traffic regulation prohibiting vehicles from 
passing one another at street or highway 
intersection, 53 ALR 2d 850. 
Duty in operating automobile at curve or 
on hill, 57 ALR 589. 
Reciprocal duties of drivers of automobiles 
or other vehicles proceeding in the same 
direction, 104 ALR 485. 
Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities 
where driver of motor vehicle attempts to 
pass on right' of other motor vehicle proceed-
ing in same direction, 38 ALR 2d 114. 
Rights and liabilities as between drivers of 
motor vehicles proceeding in same direction, 
where one or both attempt to pass on left of 
another vehicle so proceeding, 27 ALR 2d 317. 
41-6-58. Limitations on driving on left side of road - Exceptions. 
(a) No vehicle shall at any time be driven on the left side of the roadway 
under the following conditions: 
(1) When approaching or upon a crest of a grade or a curve on the high-
way where the driver's view is obstructed within such distance as to create 
a hazard in the event another vehicle might approach from the opposite 
direction. 
(2) When approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection 
or railroad grade crossing. 
(3) When the view is obstructed upon approaching within 100 feet of 
any bridge, viaduct, or tunnel. 
(b) The foregoing limitation shall not apply upon a one-way roadway, 
nor under the conditions described in section 41-6-53 (a) (2) nor to the 
driver of a vehicle turning left onto or from an alley, private road or drive-
way. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 48; C. 1943, 
57-7-125; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 16. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1975 amendment substituted "on the 
left side" for "to the left side" in the first 
sentence of subsec. (a); substituted "or upon 
a crest of a grade or a curve on the highway" 
for "the crest of a grade or upon a curve in 
the highway" near the beginning of subd. 
(a)(l); and added "nor under the conditions 
described * * * road or driveway" to subsec. 
(b). 
Driving to left side of road within 100 feet 
of intersection. 
It was held that lower court properly 
directed a verdict of no cause of action where 
plaintiff did not make tum at intersection, 
but south of intersection some 50 feet. Hart 
v. Kerr (1946) 110 U 479, 175 P 2d 475. 
"Intersection." 
Jury was properly instructed that site of 
collision was "intersection" under statute in 
light of evidence that crossing road inter-
sected main highway from both east and 
west and crossed it at right angles, that main 
highway was widened for about 1/10 of a 
mile in both directions to provide extra lane 
for acceleration and deceleration in entering 
or leaving highway and that th.ere-were stop 
signs at both east and west side to warn 
oncoming traffic; result was not changed by 
fact that crossing road was only infrequently 
traveled dirt road and not readily observable 
to main highway traveler. Hathaway v. Marx 
(1968) 21 U 2d 33, 439 P 2d 850. 
Passing within 100 feet of intersection. 
An instruction that a driver had no right 
in attempting to pass at an intersection was 
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error where, at the point where the collision 
occurred there were no markers prohibiting 
passing, there was nothing to indicate a 
turn-off road from the highway, and no 
markers showing that a road left the high-
way in the area. Douglas v. Gigandet (1958) 8 
U 2d 245, 332 P 2d 932. 
Violation as prima facie evidence of negli-
gence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by 
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence 
of negligence subject only to justification or 
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F 
Supp 254, affirmed in 409 F 2d 1009. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles P 153. 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 268. 
7A AmJur 2d 440, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 263. 
Giving audible signal where driver's view 
ahead is obstructed at curve or hill, duty and 
liability with respect to, 16 ALR 2d 897. 
Responsibility for collision at night of 
automobiles, one of which, with lights on, is 
standing or moving on wrong side of road, 59 
ALR 590. 
Right or duty to turn in violation of law of 
road to avoid traveler or obstacle, 24 ALR 
1304, 63 ALR 277, 113 ALR 1328. 
Statutes regulating or forbidding passing 
on hill by vehicle, construction and applica-
tion of, 60 ALR 2d 211. 
Street or highway intersection within traf-
fic rules, definition, 7 ALR 3d 1204. 
41-6-59. Signs and markings on roadway - No passing zones -
Exceptions. (1) The department of transportation and local authorities 
are authorized to determine those portions of any highway under their 
respective jurisdictions where overtaking and passing or driving on the left 
of the roadway would be especially hazardous and may by appropriate 
signs or markings on the roadway indicate the beginning and end of such 
zones and when such signs or markings are in place and clearly visible 
to an ordinarily observant person every driver of a vehicle shall obey the 
directions thereof. 
(2) Where signs or markings are in place to define a no-passing zone 
as set forth in paragraph (1), no driver shall at any time drive on the left 
side of the roadway within such no-passing zone or on the left side of any 
pavement striping designed to mark such no-passing zone throughout its 
lengths. 
(3) This section does not apply to the conditions described in section 
41-6-53(a) (2) nor to the driver of a vehicle turning left onto or from an 
alley, private road or driveway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 49; C. 1943, 
57-7-126; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 17; 1978, ch. 33, 
§ 13. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1975 amendment designated the 
former section as subsec. (a); inserted "and 
local authorities" near the beginning of 
subsec. (a); inserted "under their respective 
jurisdictions" in subsec. (a); added subsecs. 
(b) and (c); and made minor changes in 
phraseology. 
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs. 
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); substituted "depart-
ment of transportation" for "state road com-
mission" near the beginning of subsec. (1); 
and made minor changes in phraseology. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Violation as question of fact. 
Violation of statute providing that driver 
shall not follow another vehicle more closely 
than is reasonable and prudent is question of 
fact to be determined by trier of facts with 
result that appellate court could not say that 
as matter of law that lower court should 
have directed verdict in favor of plaintiff 
because defendant had violated statute. 
Fairbourn v. Lloyd (1968) 21 U 2d 62, 440 P 
2d 257. 
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41-6-60. One-way traffic - Signs. (a) The department of transporta-
tion and local authorities may designate any highway, roadway, part of 
a roadway or specific lanes under their respective jurisdictions upon which 
vehicular traffic shall proceed in one direction at all or such times as shall 
be indicated by official traffic-control devices. 
(b) Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall 
be driven only in the direction indicated by official traffic-control devices. 
(c) A vehicle passing around a rotary traffic island shall be driven only 
to the right of such island. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 50; C. 1943, 
57-7-127; L. 1969, ch. 109, § 1; 1979, ch. 242, 
§ 15. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment rewrote this section 
which read: "(a) The state road commission 
may designate any highway or any separate 
roadway under its jurisdiction for one-way 
traffic and shall erect appropriate signs 
giving notice thereof. (b) Upon a roadway 
designated and signposted for one-way traffic 
a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction 
designated." 
The 1979 amendment substituted "depart-
ment of transportation" for "state road com-
mission" in subsec. (a). 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles ¢:;, 14. 
60 CJS Motor Vehicles § 16. 
41-6-61. Roadway divided into marked lanes - Rules - Traffic-
control devices. Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more 
clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others 
consistent herewith shall apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a 
single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has 
first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. 
(2) Upon a roadway which is divided into three lanes and provides for 
two-way movement of traffic, a vehicle shall not be driven in the center 
lane except when overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the 
same direction when such center lane is clear of traffic within a safe dis-
tance, or in preparation of making or completing a left turn or where such 
center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the same 
direction that the vehicle is proceeding and such allocation is designated 
by official traffic-control devices. 
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be erected directing specified 
traffic to use a designated lane or designating those lanes to. be used by 
traffic moving in a particular direction regardless of the center of the road-
way and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such device. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 51; C. 1943, 
57-7-128; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 18; 1978, ch. 33, § 14. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment substituted "two or 
more" for "three or more" in the preliminary 
paragraph. 
The 1975 amendment inserted "and pro-
vides for two-way movement of traffic" in 
subd. (b); substituted "traveling in the same 
direction when such center lane is clear of 
traffic within a safe distance" in subd. (b) for 
"where the roadway is clearly visible and 
such center lane is clear of traffic within a 
safe distance"; substituted "such allocation is 
designated by official traffic-control devices" 
in subd. (b) for "is signposted to give notice 
of such allocation"; rewrote subd. (c) which 
read: "Official signs may be erected directing 
slow-moving traffic to use a designated lane 
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or allocating specified lanes to traffic moving 
in the same direction and drivers of vehicles 
shall obey the directions of every such sign"; 
and made minor changes in phraseology. 
The 1978 amendment redesignated subds. 
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); and inserted "or com-
pleting" near the middle of subd. (2). 
Violation as prima facie evidence of negli-
gence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by 
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence 
of negligence subject only to justification or 
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F 
Supp 254, affirmed in 409 F 2d 1009. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles ¢;;, 153. 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 274. 
41-6-62. Following another vehicle - Proximity and distance -
Caravan or motorcade - Exception for funeral procession. (1) The 
driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is 
reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles 
and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway. 
(2) The driver of any truck or motor vehicle drawing another vehicle 
when traveling upon a roadway outside of a business or residence district 
and which is following another truck or motor vehicle drawing another 
vehicle shall, whenever conditions permit, leave sufficient space so that an 
overtaking vehicle may enter and occupy such space without danger, except 
that this shall not prevent a truck or motor vehicle drawing another vehi-
cle from overtaking and passing any vehicle or combinations of vehicles. 
(3) Motor vehicles being driven upon any roadway outside of a business 
or residence district in a caravan or motorcade whether or not towing 
other vehicles shall be so operated as to allow sufficient space between each 
such vehicle or combination of vehicles so as to enable any other vehicle 
to enter and occupy such space without danger. This provision shall not 
apply to funeral processions. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 52; C. 1943, 
57-7-129; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 19; 1978, ch. 33, § 15. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment inserted "or motor 
vehicle" after "any truck" in subsec. (b ); and 
added subsec. (c). 
The 1975 amendment rewrote subsec. (b) 
which provided a distance requirement of 150 
feet between truck or motor vehicle except 
when passing. 
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs. 
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); inserted "so that an 
overtaking vehicle may enter and occupy 
such space" in subsec. (2); and inserted 




Section 41-6-63 (C. 1943, 57-7-129.10, 
enacted by L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78, 
§ 3; 1959, ch. 67, § 1 ), relating to distinctive 
Violation as prima facie evidence of negli-
gence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by 
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence 
of negligence subject only to justification or 
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F 
Supp 254, affirmed in 409 F 2d 1009. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles ¢;;, 172(2). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 326. 
7A AmJur 2d 434-442, Automobiles and 
Highway Traffic §§ 260-265. 
Reciprocal duties of drivers of automobiles 
or other vehicles proceeding in the same 
direction, 104 ALR 485. 
roadway markings and prohibiting driving to 
the left thereof, was repealed by Laws 1975, 
ch. 207, § 61. For present provisions, see 
41-6-59. 
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41-6-63.10. Highway divided into two separate roadways by divid-
ing section - Unlawful actions of drivers - Dividing section defined 
and described. Whenever a highway has been divided into two separate 
roadways by a dividing section, it shall be unlawful to drive any vehicle 
upon any such highway except to the right of such dividing section, or to 
drive any vehicle over, upon, or across any such dividing section or to make 
any left turn or semicircular or U-turn on any such divided highway, 
except through a plainly marked opening in such dividing section designed 
and designated for such left turn, semicircular or U-turn, unless a sign or 
signs authorized and displayed by the department of transportation or 
other governmental agency shall otherwise indicate. 
A dividing section shall divide a highway into two separate roadways 
and shall consist of: 
(1) An unpaved dividing area; or, 
(2) A physical barrier, curbs, or other clearly indicated dividing area 
so constructed as to impede vehicular traffic across the same; or, 
(3) A dividing area of over two feet in width defined by either: 
(a) A standard double line marking on each side of the dividing section, 
each double line marking consisting of two four-inch wide lines four inches 
apart, or 
(b) Other marking, on each side of the dividing section of a type desig-
nated by the department of transportation to indicate no driving along a 
highway to the left thereof. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-63.10, enacted by L. 
1959, ch. 67, § 2; L. 1979, ch. 242, § 16. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1979 amendment substituted "depart-
ment of transportation" for "state road com-
mission" in two places. 
Collateral References. 
Automobile accidents on street or highway 
divided by parkway or other neutral strip, 
165 ALR 1418. 
41-6-64. Controlled-access highways - Driving upon and from 
highways. No person shall drive a vehicle onto or from any controlled-ac-
cess highway except at such entrances and exits as are established by 
public authority. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-64, re-enacted by L. 
1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 20; 1978, 
ch. 33, § 16; 1979, ch. 242, § 17. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1955, ch. 71, § 1 repealed old section 
41-6-64 (C. 1943, 57-7-129.11, enacted by L. 
1949, ch. 65, § 1), relating to driving onto or 
from limited-access roadways, and enacted 
new section 41-6-64. 
The 1975 amendment substituted "except 
at such entrances and exits as are estab-
lished by public authority" for "from a local 
service road except through an opening pro-
vided for that purpose in the dividing curb, 
or dividing section or dividing line which sep-
arate such service road from the limited-
access highway proper"; and made minor 
changes in phraseology. 
The 1978 amendment deleted three subdivi-
sions which read: "(1) drive a vehicle over, 
upon, or across any curb, central dividing 
section or other separation or dividing line 
on limited access highways; (2) make a left 
turn or a semi-circular or U-turn except 
through an opening provided for that pur-
pose in the dividing curb section, separation 
or line; (3) drive any vehicle except in the 
proper lane provided for that purpose and in 
the proper direction and to the right of the 
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central dividing curb, separation section, or 
line" after "No person shall" at the begin-
ning of the section; and made a minor change 
in phraseology. 
The 1979 amendment substituted "con-
trolled-access" for "limited-access." 
Cross-References. 
Limited-access facilities generally, 
27-12-111 et seq. 
41-6-65. Controlled-access highways - Prohibiting use by class or 
kind of traffic - Traffic-control devices. The department of transporta-
tion by resolution or order entered in its minutes, and local authorities 
by ordinance may regulate or prohibit the use of any controlled-access 
roadway within their respective jurisdictions by any class or kind of traffic 
which is found to be incompatible with the normal and safe movement of 
traffic. 
The department of transportation or the local authority adopting any 
such prohibition shall erect and maintain official traffic-control devices on 
the controlled-access highway on which such prohibitions are applicable 
and when in place no person shall disobey the restrictions stated on such 
devices. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-129.12, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 21; 1979, 
ch. 242, § 18. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1975 amendment substituted "regulate 
or prohibit the use of * * * and safe move-
ment of traffic" in the first paragraph for 
"with respect to any limited-access roadway 
under their respective jurisdictions, prohibit 
the use of any such roadway by pedestrians, 
bicycles, or other .nonmotorized traffic, or by 
any person operating a motor-driven cycle"; 
substituted in · the second paragraph, "high-
way" for "roadway," "traffic-control devices" 
for "official signs"; and made minor changes 
in phraseology. 
The 1979 amendment substituted "depart-
ment of transportation" for "state road com-
mission" in two places; and substituted "con-




TURNS AND SIGNALS ON STARTING, STOPPING 
OR TURNING 
41-6-66. Turning - Manner - Traffic-control devices. 
41-6-67. Turning around - Prohibited on curve or near crest of grade. 
41-6-68. Starting vehicles. 
41-6-69. Turning - Signals - Stopping or sudden decrease in speed - Signal flashing pro-
hibited. 
41-6-70. Signals - Methods of giving - Signal lamps. 
41-6-71. Signals - Manner of giving. 
41-6-66. Turning - Manner - Traffic-control devices. The driver 
of a vehicle intending to turn shall do so as follows: 
(1) Right Turns - Both the approach for a right turn and a right turn 
shall be made as close as practical to the right-hand curb or edge of the 
roadway. 
(2) Left Turns - The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left shall 
approach the turn from the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to 
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